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Abstract  
Under Dmitry Medvedev’s and now Vladimir Putin’s presidency, modernization was/is 
presented as a national imperative for the Russian government. It became a political slogan 
and a means by which to restore Russia’s power internally and externally. This campaign 
serves to push the agendas of some of Russia’s ruling elite within the larger ruling camp. 
This article tries to answer the following question: How do Russian elites understand 
modernization, both historically and within the current context? It concludes that Russian 
“political technologists”, who have been in power in the last 15 years, have become masters 
in the art of silencing the voices of those who take a critical view of the government’s 
policies. 
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In 2011, under his “Go Russia!” motto, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev (2008-
2012) called on citizens to take a fresh look at their country’s history and direction. He 
was intent on introducing a debate on the need for economic modernization, which has 
been a recurrent theme throughout Russia’s history, dating back to the time of Peter 
the Great.  
Modernization is now being presented as a national imperative under the Putin 
administration, repackaged as a political slogan and embossed in the usual layers of 
rhetoric and nationalism. This campaign serves to push the agendas of some of 
Russia’s ruling elite within the larger ruling camp. But how do Russian elites understand 
modernization, both historically and within the current context?   
Russia is too often misunderstood by Western experts and politicians, as there appears 
to be no middle ground. Many either take a very negative and somber view of the 
country1, or they claim that Russia is so unique and exotic that it is in a category of its 
own, not comparable to other states2
Both these views of Russia are misleading. The first paints a very gloomy picture of 
Russia’s social and economic conditions, and uses historical precedent to argue that it 
has always been perceived as a dangerous country. It cannot be denied that there have 
been, and continue to be, many disturbing aspects to Russia’s development, but this 
fascination with Russia’s dark side underpins the perceptions of Russia most commonly 
heard in the West, which derives from an overly selective recalling of historical events. 
The second understanding, that Russia is an exotic, almost oriental place, full of 
paradoxes, mystery and intrigue, implies that it cannot be so easily understood by 
applying generic social science paradigms. The argument is that as Russia is culturally 
unique, it does not come close to adopting normal development paths, particularly 
. 
                                                     
1  See Blank, Stephen (2015). Putin Celebrates Stalinism. Again. Atlantic Council, 27 May. Available at: 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/putin-celebrates-stalinism-again; Pipes, R. (1991). 
The Russian Revolution. Vintage, 1st Ed; Brzezinski, Zbigniew (1990). Grand Failure: The Birth and Death 
of Communism in the Twentieth Century. Collier Books; Nolte, E., and Furret, F. (2004). Fascism and 
Communism. University of Nebraska Press, 1st Ed. 
2  See Getty, J. H., and Naumov, Oleg (1999). The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the 
Bolsheviks, 1932-1939. Yale University Press; Malia, M. (1995). The Soviet Tragedy: A History of 
Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991. Free Press; Applebaum, A. (2003). Gulag: A History. Doubleday; Raeff, 
M. (1994). Political Ideas and Institutions in Imperial Russia. Boulder, CO: Westview. 
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when compared to those of Western countries. Taking this view is, in effect, a means of 
avoiding making any definite statement about what Russia is. 
Russia is different in many ways, not only from the other states that constituted the 
former Soviet Union but from countries of comparable size and population. It also 
stands apart because of the geopolitical role it plays in both Europe and Eurasia, and its 
strategic significance as the world’s second largest nuclear power. It wields important 
political clout due to its status as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council. 
Above all, Russia is unique because it perceives itself to be different – but all countries 
perceive themselves to be unique in some way, and wants to remain different.  
The collapse and rebuilding of Russia’s state structures, political institutions and 
economic system after the demise of the USSR in 1991 created enormous uncertainty 
for Russia and affected the way Russians defined themselves as a nation. For instance, 
although today’s Russian Federation is the direct successor of a thousand years of 
statehood, the political forms and boundaries of the contemporary state differ from any 
that Russia has known. Like the Soviet Union, the Russian Republic was also formally 
considered a federation and had internal ethnic-national subdivisions. But in contrast to 
the larger USRR, only some of its constituent members are ethnic national territories. 
Why? Because most of the republics in the Russian Federation are pure administrative 
subdivisions populated by Russians. Under the Soviet system, Russia’s internal ethnic 
national territories were classified by size and status into autonomous republics and 
autonomous provinces and by national districts. Today, all the former autonomous 
republics are simply termed republics. In many republics, the indigenous ethnic group 
comprises a minority of the population. Since 1991 the names and status of some of 
the constituent units in Russia have changed3
The modernization imperative took root in the so-called third cycle of development, or 
post-communist cycle, which began in 1991, the first two cycles being the period from 
the Revolution of 1905 to the February Revolution of 1917 and the Communist period 
(1917-1991)
. 
4. In September 2009, Dmitry Medvedev wrote on the President of Russia’s 
website that “previous attempts to modernize Russia – those initiated by Peter the 
Great and the Soviet Union – had partially failed and had come at a high social cost to 
Russia”5
Looking back at the transformation of Russia since 1991, this period has been 
characterized by alternating pushes for reform and stability and has contributed in 
large part to the creation of a hybrid system combining elements of superficial 
Westernization with the remnants of a Soviet iron fist policy. The overall results appear 
to be an elite-led modernization of the economic system and society that has become 
fused with a greater degree of authoritarianism in the political domain
. 
6
Government elites have been transformed into a new kind of ruling class – similar to 
royalty – which today controls the many layers of state and para-state bureaucracies, 
military and law enforcement institutions. This class is linked with Russian corporations 
through the use of administrative resources and in its rent-seeking behavior. For 
. 
                                                     
3  See Sakwa, R. (2008). Russian Politics and Society. London and New York, Routledge, Fourth Edition. 
4  See Figes, Orlando (2014). Revolutionary Russia, 1891–1991, Metropolitan Books. 
5  Medvedev, Dmitry (2009). Go Russia! President of Russia Official Web-Site, September 10. Available at: 
http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/news/298 
6  Mezrich, B. (2015). Once Upon a Time in Russia: The Rise of the Oligarchs. A True Story of Ambition, 
Wealth, Betrayal, and Murder. Atria Books. 
 JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations 
ISSN: 1647-7251 
Vol. 6, n.º 2 (November 2015-April 2016), pp. 32-43  
Russia's "conservative modernization": how to silence the voices of the opposition 
Richard Rousseau 
 35 
 
instance, most of the firms run by former KGB colleagues of Putin – whether Russian 
Railroad President Vladimir Yakunin or Igor Sechin, the Executive Chairman of Rosneft 
– and hit hard by the EU and U.S. sanctions provoked by the war in Eastern Ukraine 
have received bailouts from the Russian government7
The post-Soviet ruling class, particularly the group known as the “siloviki” (those ‘men 
in uniform’ reared in intelligence and law enforcement agencies and the Soviet Army), 
reached the helm of power under Putin’s first presidency (2000-2008) and have 
effectively alienated themselves from the Russian social fabric
. Such vested interests synergize 
and determine Russia’s future.  
8
The Putinist, semi-authoritarian “new integration project for Eurasia”
. The gap between the 
ruling class and ordinary Russians is similar in degree to that found in the poorest third 
world countries. Because of this widening gap between the rulers and those being ruled 
Russian sociologists have diagnosed a deepening social-economic crisis in 
contemporary Russia. 
9, which 
purportedly aims to provide the possibility of a leap of civilization into the 21st century, 
has actually become a barrier to social change10. Putin’s “conservative modernization”, 
which has predominated in official discourse in Russia since 2011, has, in fact, 
sanctioned the social protection and prolongation of the status quo. It has come to 
symbolize merely the good intentions and esteem of the powers that be11. This style of 
modernization has little in common with the ideas of Western European modernizers of 
the 20th century12. For some Russian observers, it compares with that of the 
“obstructionists” and “reactionaries” of the epoch of “stagnation” under Leonid 
Brezhnev’s leadership13
 
. 
Conservative Modernization 
Liberalism in the West has developed over a long time as private property, individual 
freedoms and rationalist thinking developed, whereas in Russia all three has been 
absent or were severely limited. The main problem in Russia was that the subject of 
liberalism, homo economicus, was largely absent, and therefore liberalism found its 
main support among the urban liberal intelligentsia14
                                                     
7  Miller, Chris (2015). Russia’s Economy: Sanctions, Bailouts, and Austerity. 
. 
Foreign Policy Research 
Institute, February. Available at: http://www.fpri.org/articles/2015/02/russias-economy-sanctions-
bailouts-and-austerity 
8  See Hoffman, D. E. (2011). The Oligarchs: Wealth And Power In The New Russia. Public Affairs, Revised 
Edition; Illarionov, Andrey (2009). The Siloviki in Charge. Journal of Democracy, 20 (2), pp. 69-72. 
9  Putin, Vladimir (2013). A New Integration Project for Eurasia: The Future in the Making. Izvestia, October  
3. (Reproduced on the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union website). 
Available at: http://www.russianmission.eu/en#sthash.H1eXjC3e.dpuf 
10  Inozemtsev, Vladislav (2010). Russie, Une Société Libre Sous Contrôle Autoritaire. (Russia – A Free 
Society Under Authoritarian Control). Le Monde Diplomatique, No.10, p. 4-5. 
11  See Inozemtsev, Vladislav (2010). Istoriya i Uroki Rossiyskikh Modernizatsiy. (The History and Lessons of 
Russian Modernisations). Rossiya i Sovremenniy Mir, No 2 [67], April-June, p. 6-11; Trenin, Dmitri 
(2010). Russia’s Conservative Modernization: A Mission Impossible? SAIS Review, Volume 30, Number 1, 
Winter-Spring, pp. 27-37. 
12  Von Laue, Theodore H. (1987). The World Revolution of Westernization. The Twentieth Century in Global 
Perspective. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. 
13  Inozemtsev, Vladislav (2010). O Tsennostyakh I Normakh. (On values and Norms). Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 
5 March, p. 3. 
14  Raeff, M. (1994). Political Ideas and… Op. Cit., p. 56. 
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In the West liberalism (including private property, individualism and the defense of the 
individual and property rights in law) has come before democracy, but in Russia it was 
the democratic revolution itself in 1987-1991 that created the bases of liberalism. This 
it tried to do by diffusing the economic power that is associated with private property to 
establish the basis for individual rights; but at the same time asserted the need for the 
concentration of political power, a post-communist Leviathan, in the form of 
presidential power15
Economic liberalism but not necessarily fully fledged democracy was on the agenda. 
The deconcentration of economic power, moreover, succeeded in establishing a class of 
“new Russians” and oligarchs, but appeared to do little for the mass of the population, 
a large proportion of whom lost the social guarantees of the Soviet period and gained 
very little in return. Liberalism remained far from hegemonic, challenged by the 
counter-ideology of statism, and neither was it universal, limited to certain enclaves of 
globalism in Russia, Moscow, St Petersburg and some other cities. Nevertheless, 
despite the loss of territory and the collapse of the comforting certainties of an all-
embracing ideology it would be false to argue that liberalism failed to take root in 
Russia.  
. 
At the heart of the liberal democratic revolution is the attempt to establish a market 
economy and representative government. But how? While the liberal reformers of the 
1990s paid lip service to representative government, faced with what to them appeared 
intractable opposition from the conservatives in parliament many argued in favor of an 
“iron hand”, the strong presidency and state acting as a type of enlightened despotism 
pushing through the reforms but preserving the main post-Soviet political institutions. 
Boris Yeltsin, the first post-Soviet president, appeared to succeed where Mikhail 
Gorbachev failed in finding a mid-path between representative government and 
outright coercion, a type of virtual representation of political and social interests 
described by the various labels of delegative, illiberal or regime democracy. The 
collapse of communist power and the weak development of a democratic counter-
system allowed bureaucratic and elite structures to establish a relatively high degree of 
autonomy.  
This was most evident in the government itself in the 1990s, established as a sort of 
technocratic high command of the economic transition. In the regions, too, the control 
functions once fulfilled by the Communist Party were only weakly replaced by the 
system of federal representatives at the regional or federal district level. While social 
change and economic transformation were perhaps prerequisites for a liberal order, 
political development and democratization require more. 
In reaction to the attempt to achieve a liberal modernization without liberals a type of 
post-communist Russian conservatism emerged. Conservatism in Russia has much 
deeper roots and philosophical traditions to draw on than liberalism; but at the turn of 
the century and at the onset of Putin’s third presidential term (2011-2012) attempts 
were made to combine the two in a distinctive Russian ideology of conservative 
modernization.  
                                                     
15  Gill, G, and Merkwick, R., D. (2000). Russia’s Stillborn Democracy? From Gorbachev to Yeltsin. Oxford 
University Press, pp. 127-150. 
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Perhaps the most potent source of conservative modernization, however, was the 
patriotic view of the need for a strong state combined with individual rights and a 
constitutional system16
Putin’s conservative modernization drew on pre-revolutionary traditions, those of the 
Soviet period, and in the post-Soviet period on world experience of liberal and social 
conservatism. It sought to combine the liberal emphasis on economic freedoms with 
gradual restraints on individual and political rights and an organic conception of the 
larger community, the attempt to preserve Russia’s distinctive traditions, to revive the 
Orthodox Church and to salvage something of the social policies of the Soviet period. A 
distinctive brand of conservative modernization, espoused by neo-communists and 
some national-patriots, sought the roots of the ‘new community’ in Russian traditions. 
Putin’s rule represents a powerful combination of these attributes and adapts the 
modernization drive to Russian current and historical condition. 
. Thus, in Russia a unique synthesis of economic liberalism, 
modernization and political conservatism took shape and assumed political form since 
Putin's return to the presidency in March 2012. 
The very concept of democracy in Russia now appears de-legitimized, while the word 
itself is used as a term of opprobrium. The credibility gap between the statements of 
the leadership and the realities of daily life gave rise to what has been called a mistrust 
culture and a pervading sense of social nihilism. The ideology of conservative 
modernization means that the political institutions of the state became more ordered, 
leadership more resolute and consistent. In other words, political stability is better 
assured by an authoritarian regime than by democratic disarray. 
In his book Political Order in Changing Societies published in 1968, Samuel Huntington 
argued that societies in transition to modernity require firm, if not military, leadership 
to negotiate the enormous strains placed on society by period of rapid change17
Russia today has a hybrid political system, both democratic and authoritarian, but more 
and more leaning towards the latter type. The freedoms that had begun during glasnost 
blossomed into genuine freedom of speech and the press, and the variety of 
publications and the openness of their content were unparalleled in Russia’s history. 
Censorship was explicitly forbidden and only the courts could permanently ban 
newspapers, and then only on specific grounds and after due warning.  
. In 
Putin’s Russia the “praetorian” role is being fulfilled by the presidency and his closest 
allies rather than the army. The presidency recreated a center not only for the nation 
but also for political society, the center that had crumbled under Yeltsin. Since 2012 the 
fear, however, that the strong presidency would not act as a bulwark against 
lawlessness but would itself be the vehicle for a new form of arbitrariness has proved 
founded.  
The hybrid nature of authoritarianism democracy in Putin’s Russia arose out of the 
conflict between ends and means and has a dual function: to undermine the old 
structures of social and political power dominated by the oligarchs, while at the same 
time to provide the framework for the growth of conservative forms that could 
                                                     
16  Markov, Sergei (2009). Conservative Modernization. The Moscow Times, November 30. Available at: 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/tmt/390539.html; Trenin, Dmitri (2010). Russia’s 
Conservative Modernization: A Mission Impossible? Carnegie Moscow Center, May 25. Available at: 
http://carnegie.ru/2010/05/25/russia-s-conservative-modernization-mission-impossible 
17  Huntington, Samuel (1968). Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven/London: Yale University 
Press, p. 1. 
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ultimately stand on their own. Under Putin, moreover, regional and federal politics 
became more insulated from the pressures of economic interests, and the presidency 
operates less as a freeloading operator in the interstices of the state and society, as it 
had done under Yeltsin, but as part of a state order seeking to modernize the Russian 
state and society. 
 
Negative Effects 
This conservative modernization model has had many negative effects. The most 
notable are the scale and systematic nature of corruption and legal nihilism. Valery 
Zorkin, Chairman of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation and one of the 
most powerful personalities in Russia, has publicly admitted that crime is ingrained in 
the state apparatus and economy and that the interests of members of the state 
apparatus and business class run parallel with the interests of criminal circles. In an 
interview with Izvestia in 2004, he said that ‘bribe taking in the courts has become one 
of the biggest corruption markets in Russia‘. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the level 
of corruption in the judiciary increases the further down the hierarchy and further away 
from Moscow one goes18. In 2004, Russia was ranked 90th out of 149 countries in the 
Transparency International Global Corruption Index, whereas in 2013 it was 127th, 
alongside notoriously corrupt countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Ivory 
Coast19. It also ranked poorly on the World Bank’s Doing Business Survey; it was 112th 
out of 185 countries, putting it on a level with ex-Soviet republics like Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan20
The Institute of Contemporary Development (INSOR) and the Center for Strategic 
Analysis (CSR), two institutions close to the Kremlin, have drawn even more telling 
conclusions on the circumstances that Russia finds itself in the middle of the second 
decade of the 21st century. They maintain that the high level of corruption is the main 
factor causing the overall “crisis” Russia is currently facing
. The Medvedev and Putin governments have however 
taken some measures to combat corruption and change foreigners’ perceptions that 
Russia is not an easy place to do business. In 2010, Medvedev signed the OECD’s Anti-
Bribery Convention, even though Russia is only a partner of this powerful economic 
organization. 
21
Russian society has undergone substantial changes in its structure and stratification 
and these are still in progress. With the development of global mass communication 
technologies and increased access to independent sources of information, post-
. The distain for the state 
apparatus, which is felt by the vast majority of Russians, is slowing down the 
modernization of political institutions. The ruling power has ‘slept through’ the social 
changes brought about by a combination of a transitional economy and the loss of 
safety mechanisms for the vulnerable. 
                                                     
18  Blass, Tom (2007). Combating Corruption and Political Influence in Russia’s Court System. Global 
Corruption Report 2007: Corruption in Judicial Systems. Transparency International. Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 31-34; Gilinskiy, Yakov (2006). Crime in Contemporary. European Journal of 
Criminology Russia, Vol. 3, p. 259. 
19  Corruption Perceptions Index 2013. Transparency International. (2013). Available at: 
https://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results  
20 INSOR Experts Focus Attention on Fight Against Corruption. (2008). Institute of Contemporary 
Development (INSOR), June 26. Available at: http://www.insor-russia.ru/en/_news/890   
21  INSOR Experts Focus Attention on Fight Against Corruption. (2008). Institute of Contemporary 
Development (INSOR), June 26. Available at: http://www.insor-russia.ru/en/_news/890 
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Communist citizens have come out of hibernation and started developing skills in 
grassroots self-organization. Millions of middle class workers and hundreds of youth 
groups, radicalized by a lack of opportunities to improve their social status, have joined 
up with the opposition intelligentsia. In fact, the stereotypical image of Russians’ 
incapacity to react and take to the street when confronted with their government’s 
abuses and incompetence was shown to be a thing of the past during Putin’s third term 
as president in May 2012. 
In reaction to what was perceived as widespread election fraud, a number of parallel 
institutions and social organizations sprung up to campaign against the authorities’ 
manipulation of the electoral process and other undemocratic undertakings during the 
2012 election. Social networks and projects such as the “Online Parliament” quickly 
gained popularity, often in response to the Kremlin’s blatant disregard of people’s 
fundamental civil rights. This heedless form of elite rule explains in part why freedom 
has been constantly decreasing22
Many analysts predict that the next few years will bring forth a dynamic opposition 
force which might even surpass the one that swept away the USSR between 1986 and 
1991
. 
23. They conjecture that a serious deterioration of the economic situation and 
revived social disturbances in the Northern Caucuses will be major catalysts to opening 
the gates of discontent and letting loose a flood of political activism within Russian 
society. In the context of the crisis in Eastern Ukraine, and the economic sanctions that 
the EU and the U.S. have imposed on Russia in retaliation, the year 2015 may indeed 
be extremely dangerous for the Kremlin. This is the opinion of Igor Yurgens, Chairman 
of the Management Board of INSOR, who has openly acknowledged that Russia is “in a 
recession now, and soon we’ll be in a free fall”24
International economic conditions have the potential to play a dynamic part in Russia’s 
future. Growing global interdependence has caused the country’s economic growth to 
become more dependent on foreign trade, forcing it to pay more attention to its 
competitiveness in world markets. Meanwhile, the “Great Recession” of 2008-2009 
painfully disclosed the fallibility of resource-based economies.  
. 
The 8% decrease in GDP that Russia experienced in the wake of the 2008-2009 world 
economic crisis has brought about the realization among Kremlin insiders that not only 
is proper trade diversification of paramount necessity but encompassing economic 
modernization must be implemented promptly. There are serious economic 
vulnerabilities, not least Russia’s heavy dependence on the export of its natural 
resources and the weakness of its manufacturing, service and hi-tech industries. 
Russia’s educational, scientific and technological potential, like the industrial facilities 
inherited from the Soviet Union, have either run their course or been exhausted. Many 
                                                     
22  Livejournal, Online Parliament and Freedom House. (2011). The Voice of Russia, April 21. Available at: 
http://sputniknews.com/voiceofrussia/radio_broadcast/36172287/49273362/?link-1 
23  See Fauconnier, Clémentine (2011). Conflit et Compétition Politiques Dans La “Démocratie Souveraine” : 
L’Opposition Vue Par Russie Unie. Revue d’études comparatives Est-Ouest, 42 (1), March, p. 17-36; 
Narizhnaya, Khristina (2013); Russians Go West. The World Policy Journal, March 30, p. 95-103. At 
available: http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/spring2013/russians-go-west ; Caracciolo, Lucio (2015). 
Democratorship: The Ancient Heart of Putin’s Regime. Stratfor, March 27. Available at: 
https://www.stratfor.com/the-hub/democratorship-ancient-heart-putin%E2%80%99s-regime 
24  Yurgens, Igor (2014). We Are in a Recession Now, and Soon We’ll Be in a Free Fall. Institute of 
Contemporary Development (INSOR), November 19. Available at: http://www.insor-
russia.ru/en/_news/11319 
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are no longer appropriate to the global economy, and have no place in a world of fierce 
competition between states, economies of scale and outsourcing.  
 
Different Factions 
Russia is thus facing another historic turning point. What political and economic 
direction should it now pursue? The specter of unfinished modernization processes has 
hung over the country since the time of Peter the Great in the early 18th century and 
the dilemmas faced by former and present elites are almost identical in terms of goals 
and constraints.  
Russian political leaders, as so often in their country’s history, are seeking some kind of 
magic economic formula which will satisfy everyone while preserving the political and 
economic status quo. Many believe a return to the pre-crisis situation is possible, while 
others are of the opinion that inertia will result in an uncontrolled and detrimental chain 
reaction which could nevertheless finally bring true democracy to Russia25
A good number of alarmist reports and analysis share a common conclusion: deep 
political changes, in particular an unwavering turn towards democratization and the 
rule of law, are necessary ingredients for a broader economic recovery and social well-
being
. 
26. Only such modernization will enable a cultural transformation decisive enough 
for the creation of a solid modern Russian identity and, from a legal point of view, a 
state based on the respect towards the law27. Russia must take the Westernization 
track again in order to change the political tyranny of the few into a new value-based 
political system conducive to good governance, responsible leadership, innovation, 
efficiency and freedom28
Classifying the ruling elite into two factions – conservative and liberal – is an 
oversimplification, as the political debate is many-sided within political circles. For 
instance, the reactionary faction in the Kremlin defines modernization as a means of 
optimizing the power of the current political regime, as it improves its ability to rule the 
country. Belief in a long term and stable ‘contract’ between the state and the people is 
emblematic of this view of modernization. However, such a paradigm does not preclude 
liberal economic policies, a multi-party system and the use of social mobilization in 
bringing about economic modernization to catch up with the West – and now with many 
East and Southeast Asian countries – such as President Medvedev’s “modernization 
program”, launched in 2009 but consigned to the past after 2012, exemplified
. 
29
                                                     
25  See Vstrecha s Vedushimi Rossiyskimi i Zarubezhnimi Politologami. (Meeting With the Leading Russian 
and Foreign Political Science Experts). (2010). Available at: 
. 
www.kremlin.ru/news/8882; For a detailed 
evaluation of relevant literature see: Diskin, Iosif (2009). Krizis... I Vse Zhe Modernizatsiya! (Crisis... Yet 
It’s Still Modernization!). Moscow: “Evropa” Publishing House, p. 7-16. 
26  See Aslund, Anders (2009). Why Market Reform Succeeded and Democracy Failed in Russia. Social 
Research, Spring; Russia’s Economy to Reach Pre-Crisis Level by Late 2012. (2009). RIA Novosti, 
December 16. Available at : http://en.rian.ru/business/20091216/157255443.html 
27  Rousseau, R. (2015). Russia’s Attempt To Deliver Democratic Transition Is A Non-Starter. Eurasia Review, 
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In foreign policy, the conservative faction’s perception of Russia’s place on the world 
stage borrows from Samuel Huntington’s concept of a “Clash of Civilizations”: the 
“Eurasian civilization” against the “European”. It also assumes that the current 
international system is characterized by multipolarity and the predominance of military 
power over what is now commonly called “soft power”. 
The “Conservationists”, as they are often referred to in the Russian media, are not a 
homogenous group. There are advocates of cosmetic changes and proponents of tabula 
rasa (the “ultras,” so to say) who advocate starting with a blank slate. The “Chekists” 
and “orthodox” factions believe that democracy and liberalism pose a deadly threat to 
Russia30. To some extent, the conservative modernization strand, in which the Russian 
Communist Party could be included, is ideologically close to the thoughts of the Russian 
traditionalists. It comes as no surprise that state bureaucracies, defense and law 
enforcement institutions as well as the army and large state-owned enterprises, 
especially in the natural resources sector and the military-industrial complex, have 
proven themselves bastions of conservatism31
For its part, the ‘liberal’ faction within the ruling party, United Russia, which emanated 
from the Soviet and post-Yeltsin institutional structures (i.e., the Soviet and the post-
Soviet nomenklatura) has a narrow view on modernization: it sees gradual political 
transition and liberal economic reforms as the means for preventing sudden and costly 
political revolutions, especially as the nation’s temper is expected to become 
increasingly restive and assertive
.  
32
The current situation in Russia is a remnant of – and reminiscent of – many wasted 
historic chances to modernize Russia for good and never look back. Such personalities 
as Nikolai Speranski, Pyotr Stolypin and Boris Chicherin, known as reformers in Russian 
history, strove to update Russia’s political, social and economic fabric at the turn of the 
20th century. The program of the historical Kadet Party (Constitutional Democratic 
Party) in the early months of the February Revolution of 1917 put forward reformist 
ideas which are still relevant in today’s Russia
. 
33
During the 2011 celebration of the 150th anniversary of the Emancipation of the Serfs, 
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev identified himself with the modernizing tsar, 
Alexander II. The ‘liberals’ of today are loyalists who adhere to Pushkin’s 19th century 
famous phrase: “the only European in Russia is the government”. The impulse for 
reform, they believe, must come from above in response to the cultural process that 
comes from below. A contemporary political scientist would call this a “top-down 
approach” – the only one used in the last two centuries in Russia
.  
34
Despite some dithering over the reform issue, enlightened Russian technocrats, 
politicians and academics of today (Grigory Yavlinski, Anatoly Chubais, Mikhail 
Kasyanov, Alexei Kudrin, the late opposition politician Boris Nemtsov etc.) back a policy 
. 
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Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. 
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of integration with transatlantic institutions, although which institutions they mean is 
not specified. They consider Russia to be an integral part of Europe, and their hope for 
completing Peter the Great’s work rests on the establishment and burgeoning of a truly 
Russian middle class35. Under Medvedev’s presidency, the liberal faction relied on the 
so-called program of the “four Is” or four key areas: Institutions, Infrastructure, 
Innovation, and Investment. Establishing the conditions for the development of small 
and medium-size businesses was a cornerstone of this program36
It is not far-fetched to imagine a political faction uniting the new faces of the 
democratic opposition (the oppositionist intelligentsia, mostly anti-Putin) and the 
Kremlin’s liberal faction, however small and shadowy it is, and presenting a 
modernizing platform to the leaders of political institutions and the people. For this to 
happen, however, the two camps will have to pour some water into their wine. The 
oppositionist intelligentsia considers the liberal faction to be a PR project and liberal in 
name only, which, in fact, serves to strengthen the existing status quo. Yuri Afanasiev, 
a famous Russian historian, gave an interview to Ukrainian Week in 2012 in which he 
dissected the alleged liberalization mission of the liberal camp and drew the conclusion 
that expectations of real reforms are overdone
. 
37
The conflict between Kremlin factions about how to respond to Russia’s decline in 
competitiveness has been intensifying in the wake of the 2007-2008 American-born 
global economic slowdown. Under these dire circumstances, ongoing squabbles about 
ideas and strategies of modernization are being used by the political classes to try to 
strengthen their position within the different factions. Nevertheless, the sheer 
effervescence among the growing middle class implies that a large number of Russians 
are now mobilized on issues of far-reaching political and economic importance, such as 
public-private ownership, the authoritarian political system, the corrupt and 
criminalized economy, government – federal and regional – accountability, infringement 
on press freedom and on the independence of the justice system.  
. 
The public debate has become infused with a new dignity and with new policy options. 
This unique development became more apparent in the run-up to the elections to the 
December 2011 State Duma and the 2012 presidential election. Russia now faces a 
momentous political crisis. The abuses of the Putin regime are so numerous that, 
without profound change, the protest movement is unlikely to be stopped. However, it 
is doubtful Putin will agree to reforms that would threaten his hold on power. The stage 
is therefore set for a protracted conflict between Putin and the opposition.  
Along with political and socioeconomic changes, Russian identity needs to evolve, or 
else modernization will continue to be nothing more than an empty buzzword which fills 
campaign rhetoric and gets invoked for political gain. The root of Russia’s dilemma is 
the total absence of any modern and integrated social or cultural binding force – using 
propaganda dating from the Great Patriotic War and Russia’s imperial past does not 
play a major role in shaping a national collective mindset geared towards a 
modernization project. That’s why, for many, future hopes lie in the initiatives of civic 
associations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to de-totalitarianize Russia 
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and safeguard the country from renewed authoritarian tendencies like Communism and 
Stalinism or their offspring. 
 
Conclusion 
The current economic recession, magnified by the Western sanctions, will unleash 
social tension throughout the vast Russian territory, although the likelihood of a serious 
political disruption is low in the short term. The capital of trust that Putin enjoys since 
his first presidency will not quickly melt away. Russians still remember that he 
managed to raise their living standards throughout the 2000s.  
In addition, the armada of “political technologists” working for the Kremlin is constantly 
on its toes to find ways to divide and exercise mounting pressure on the opposition. 
When opposition leader Alexey Navalny filed for permission to hold an anti-crisis 
protest on March 1, 2014, the political technologists made sure that the Communist 
Party and about ten other groups held protest that same day, a classic post-Soviet 
states’ tactic38
As inflation kicks in and the ruble’s value stays low against other currencies, Putin’s and 
the ruling party’s reputation of being competent in running the economy will fade away. 
The modernization of Russia’s political and economic systems has been put on the back 
burner in 2011 and reliance on nationalism, repression and frustration against the West 
will be the preferred strategy for the years to come. 
. After 15 years in power, they have become masters in the art of 
silencing the voices of those who take a critical view of the government’s policies.  
The Russian transition was an attempt to provide an institutional framework for 
pluralism in society, to guarantee property rights and to overcome Russia’s isolation 
from global processes. While democratic institutions have appeared, however wobbly 
and incomplete, it will take longer for the democratic culture and economic structures 
that can sustain them to emerge, for the unwritten rules of convention to impress 
themselves onto the written word of the constitution. The first post-communist Russian 
leadership laid the foundations of a new political order in the belief that Russian could 
only enter world civilization if it remade its own. In the second decade of the twenty-
first century it was clear that both Russia and the world face challenges that cannot be 
resolved in isolation from each other. 
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